Introduction
A central question in the study of China's foreign policy is the role of the PLA in national security decisionmaking. Many observers have argued that the influence of the PLA at least partly accounts for the more active and assertive posture that China adopted following the global financial crisis in 2008. As Joshua Kurlantzick writes recently in the National Journal, for example, "At times, the PLA appears to have initiated or escalated international disputes-against the wishes of the top leadership in Beijing-in order to push Chinese policy in a more hawkish direction."
1 Kurlantzick captures a sentiment in the media that the influence of the PLA on policymaking in Beijing accounts for China's recent behavior.
2 Nevertheless, assessments of the PLA's influence in national security decisionmaking are often based on conjecture or speculation, not facts. This paper seeks to illuminate this question by examining one specific issue area, territorial disputes. Territorial disputes arguably offer an "easy" test for observing the influence of the PLA on decisionmaking.
The defense of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity has been the core goals of the PLA since the founding of the PRC in 1949 (in addition to defense of the CCP's rule).
Since 1949, many of China's uses of force have involved the defense of territorial claims, such as the 1962 war with India. 3 As a result, territorial disputes should be one policy arena where the influence of the PLA can be observed and identified.
My argument is that the role of the PLA in decisionmaking in China's territorial disputes has been limited to bureaucratic influence within existing policymaking structures and processes. With the partial exception of China's interpretation of the rights of coastal states under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the PLA has not played a significant role influencing the initiation of China's territorial disputes, in the content of these claims or in how China has chosen to defend these claims. Instead, China's behavior in territorial disputes, including its recent assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea, reflects the consensus of China's top party leaders to respond to what are seen as challenges and provocations from other states. In other words, the PLA and China's leaders share the same preferences for a robust but non-militarized defense of China's claims in these disputes. There's little evidence to support the view that the PLA has escalated these disputes against the wishes of top leaders. As other scholars have argued, the PLA remains subordinate to the party through existing mechanisms of party (or civilian) control. 4 This paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the challenges that scholars and analysts must confront when seeking to determine the influence of the PLA on national security decisionmaking in China. Second, I examine the general ways in which the PLA might influence China's policies on territorial disputes, including the initiation and content of specific territorial claims as well as China's approach to managing and defending its current claims. Third, to create a baseline for the analysis of recent events, I review the role of the PLA in China's past territorial disputes. Fourth, I examine the role of the PLA in recent territorial and maritime disputes, including China's interpretation of the rights of coastal states under UNCLOS as well as the conflicts in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Overall, the findings presented below support other recent studies regarding the role of the PLA in national security decisionmaking.
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Analytical Challenges
Scholars or analysts who seek to identify the influence of the PLA on policymaking in China must overcome a variety of analytical challenges, including the kinds of influence that the PLA could exercise, the types of policies over which the PLA might exert influence, and the evidentiary basis for determining whether influence that has been exercised. Each challenge is discussed below.
The first challenge is to define the concept of influence. What motivates a great deal of concern about the nature and degree of the PLA's influence over policy today is the fear that the PLA might be able to "capture" the state in certain policy domains, which may push China to adopt more "assertive" or "hawkish" policies than it otherwise would have adopted in the absence of pressure from the PLA. Nevertheless, as a key actor within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PLA could also exert influence through existing institutional or bureaucratic channels, such as in leading small groups established to coordinate policy among different actors in the party-state.
As a result, it may be useful to identify two types of potential influence over policy.
The first draws on traditional conceptions relational power and could be called capturing influence. That is, through lobbying or independent action outside existing bureaucratic channels, the PLA could push the party-state to adopt a specific policy that it would not have otherwise adopted. By definition, such influence would represent an act of disobedience and violation of party norms. The second type of influence draws on research in bureaucratic politics and could be described as bureaucratic influence. That is, through lobbying or independent action, the PLA helps to shape the content of a given policy. The key difference between these two conceptions of influence is that, in the bureaucratic view, the PLA is only one of a number of actors that provides input on a certain decision. The final decision is taken by the party-state, who is not captured by the PLA. Part of bureaucratic influence would include the PLA's influence over tactical and operational matters, including how specific policies are implemented in the military arena. The potential for PLA influence to occur here as increased with its growing autonomy with the party system over the past twenty-five years.
A second analytical challenge concerns the types of policies over which the PLA can exert influence. The core concern revolves around whether the PLA is exerting influence beyond its military and defense portfolio to advance more parochial interests versus those of the party-state. At the level of grand strategy, for example, the PLA could seek to influence non-military issues such as the overall guiding principle for Chinese foreign policy beyond the role of the armed forces as reflected in party guidelines. Taken together, these two challenges require that scholars and analysts be precise about the type of influence being exercised and the level at which the influence is being exercised. In the jargon of political science, it requires that analysts clearly and precisely define the "dependent variable." Nevertheless, whether, in fact, the PLA has exercised influence over national security decisionmaking must confront a more difficult analytical challenge. This challenge concerns the nature of the evidence that can be mobilized to determine whether the PLA has influenced a particular policy and how. More specifically, the conclusions that can be drawn from observing the presence or absence of the PLA in a particular issue If the analyst observes the PLA playing a visible role in implementing China's approach to a particular issue, this does not necessarily mean that the PLA played a role in shaping the content of China policy on that issue. Instead, the PLA may have been carrying out the instructions of the party-state. If the analyst fails to observe the PLA playing a visible role in China's approach to a particular issue, this does not necessarily mean that the PLA did not play a role in influencing China's policy on this issue. Instead, the PLA may have shaped the policies that were adopted even if it did not help to implement them. Similarly, if analysts observe "aggressive" or "hawkish" behavior, it is not necessarily the case that it reflects the influence of the PLA on national security policy. China's top leaders might have adopted such policies for other reasons or because they share the PLA's preferences on the issue at hand.
Given this challenge, how should analysts proceed? How do we "know" that the PLA has influenced a particular policy? No simple solutions exist. Nevertheless, the 6 That is, the party determines the overall framework for military strategy. 7 At the same time, the PLA does enjoy a great deal of autonomy over military affairs at the operational level. This represents a form of bureaucratic influence, as the PLA submitted a plan for entry into the Spratlys that was vetted and approved both by the CMC and state organs. The clash itself, the local commander reportedly opened fire without receiving permission East China Sea. Instead, China's more assertive policies can largely be explained in terms of the interactive nature of these disputes, which are prone to spirals of instability.
Maritime Jurisdiction and the Interpretation of Coastal States Rights in the EEZ
Although China signed and later ratified UNCLOS, Beijing has adopted domestic legislation and policy positions that challenge some of its provisions. In particular, China seeks to limit foreign military activities in waters that it claims in two ways. First, China asserts that foreign military ships must request prior permission for "innocent passage" in China's territorial seas (that is, within waters 12nm from its coast). By contrast, article 17 of UNCLOS states that all ships "enjoy the right of innocent passage" without prior permission. Although UNCLOS does prohibit military activities in the territorial seas such as weapons exercises and intelligence gathering, it does not prohibit the movement of military vessels. China's requirement of prior permission is contained both in its 1992 law on territorial seas and in a note submitted with its instrument of ratification in 1996.
Second, China opposes military activities in its 200nm EEZ for two different reasons.
China views all military-related surveys as "marine scientific research" over which a state can claim jurisdiction in its EEZ. As a result, China opposes intelligence-gathering activities by foreign countries in these waters, which has resulted in the In the past few years, China has taken a range of actions to strengthen its claims the various disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea.
Diplomatically, China has sought to actively defend its claims when challenged by In the South China Sea, however, the PLA has played a secondary role and not a primary one. As the brief review of China's actions above demonstrates, China has not sought to actively defend its claim through use of its armed forces, especially the PLAN.
Instead, the PLA has played a secondary role, namely, to underscore China's ability to defend its claims by force, if necessary. China has done so through a series of large-scale to aid the Chinese fishermen in the shoal. 42 Although the PLA and CMS reportedly have a close working relationship, focused primarily on information-sharing and limited joint training, Chinese sources indicate that the initial decision in the crisis were made by civilian leaders and not military ones. In addition, Chinese naval vessels were never deployed in close proximity to the shoal as part of an effort to limit the potential for escalation. Noted Chinese military historian Xu Yan describes this as "Naval forces on the second line, coast guard forces on the first line" (haijun er'xian, haijing yixian).
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In the Scarborough standoff, top military leaders indicated their support for the government's approach. In an impromptu television interview, a Phoenix TV reporter tried to interview General Ma Xiaotian in early June 2012 at a conference on cyber security in Beijing. 44 In particular, Ma said: "The question you ask is very sensitive. We have the ability to defend our waters, but at the moment we have still not prepared to use military force to go defend [our waters]. If we were to do so, it would be as a last resort.
Now we are still conducting bilateral talks, using diplomatic means and some civilian Even though the PLA has not played a more active role in China's assertiveness in the South China Sea in the past few years, the possibility remains that China adopted this approach in response to PLA pressure that outside analysts cannot observe. Nevertheless, this is unlikely for two reasons. Although PLA-affiliated commentators have written on the issue, they often seem to write in reaction to events. This suggests that they are responding to developments, not driving decisionmaking. In any case, whether commentators such as Luo Yuan speak for the PLA as a whole remains unclear and is unlikely. 47 More importantly, however, China's assertiveness in these disputes can be explained as a reaction to the efforts by other claimants to strengthen and bolster their own claims. In other words, PLA influence over decisionmaking is not necessary to explain the policies and positions that China's government and party leaders would have adopted anyway. From Beijing's perspective, it has faced many challenges to its claims in the past few years. These challenges, not PLA pressure, over a superior explanation 
The East China Sea
The East China Sea involves several distinct disputes between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands and over maritime jurisdiction in the East China Sea. China also contests Japan's claim to maritime rights from Okintorishima in the Western Pacific, but does not claim sovereignty over the atoll itself. Although this dispute was largely dormant for much of the past two decades, it has become a focal point of tension between China and Japan since 2010.
Before September 2010, China had pursued a largely passive approach to the dispute over the Senkakus. Indeed, China sought to minimize attention to the dispute. Jiefangjun Bao, 3 May 2011, p. 4 in Figure 2 , the dispute was rarely discussed in articles in either the People's Daily or the PLA Daily until the crisis with Japan in 2012. Typically, an article would appear simply noting that China had restated its claim in response to some event involving the disputed islands or in response to a Japanese claim. In the mid-2000s, China began to play a more active role in limiting the potential for escalation in the dispute by preventing Chinese activists from sailing to the islands from ports on the mainland and detaining "baodiao"
activists during the 2005 protests against Japan.
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During this period, the PLA has played no visible role in the dispute over the Senkakus. Almost no public reports exist of PLAN vessels approaching the 12nm territorial waters around the islands or even the broader 24nm contiguous zone.
Similarly, PLAAF reconnaissance flights that approach Japan's ADIZ in the East China Sea usually occur several hundred kilometers from the islands themselves. 50 The PLA has played a direct role, as the transit of PLAN ships through the Japanese islands to the Western Pacific casts a shadow of China's growing military power over the dispute.
Nevertheless, PLA forces have not been used to threaten Japan explicitly in the dispute over the Senkakus, much less coerce or compel a change in Japan's policy.
On a few occasions, the PLAN appears to have played a more visible role in the dispute over maritime rights in the East China Sea. In January 2005, a single Sovremenny destroyer from the East Sea Fleet was spotted in the waters around the disputed gas field. In September 2005, a five-ship task force including a Sovremenny destroyer was again spotted in these waters. 51 These actions occurred during the peak of the dispute over the gas field and were probably intended to signal China's resolve to defend its claim to the field (which lies on the Chinese side of Japan's median) in response to challenges from Japan that China was stealing oil. However, no evidence exists that the PLA pursued these deployments to influence China's policy. Instead, they appear to have been designed to bolster China's existing policy and to resist pressure from Japan. Following the September 2010 crisis, tensions spike again in 2012 after the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from a private Japanese citizen. The purchase was intended to prevent a deterioration in China-Japan relations, as the right-wing governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, had launched a public bid to buy these three island and justified his efforts in terms of what he viewed as the inability of the national government to defend them. China's reaction to the purchase was rapid and severe:
Beijing issued territorial baselines around the islands to demarcate China's territorial waters and then dispatched vessels from the China Marine Surveillance force to "patrol" these waters, directly challenging Japan's claims to sovereignty over the islands. Nationwide protests were permitted on the 15 th , 16 th , and 18 th of September, while foreign ministry officials used exceptionally undiplomatic language to describe the purchase as an "atomic bomb." 54 Since then, China has conducted more than sixty patrols within the territorial waters of the islands, always using vessels from the China Marine Surveillance force and, after June 2013, the newly established China Coast Guard.
It is of course possible that the PLA pushed hard for a strong and powerful response to the Japanese purchase. Nevertheless, China's top civilian leaders likely shared the same preferences as the PLA. Following Ishihara's public bid in April 2013, the prospect of the purchase had become a diplomatic issue being waged in full view of the public.
Moreover, it involved a dispute over sovereignty with Japan, a country with whom China has had repeatedly strained ties since the end of the Cold War. The purchase itself occurred shortly after Hu Jintao personally requested that Noda halt the sale. Finally, it occurred on the eve of a delicate moment in Chinese politics on the eve of the 18 th party when a significant leadership change would occur, a moment that would heighten China's sensitivity to external threats.
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In the crisis itself, the PLA did not appear to be pushing for an even more assertive policy. As shown in Figure 2 , the number of articles on the Diaoyu Islands in the PLA Overall, military forces have played a secondary role in China's response to the purchase. China has not dispatched any military vessels into the territorial waters around the disputed islands. On several occasions, PLAN tasks forces transited through the contiguous waters adjacent to the territorial waters of the contested islands, usually returning to home ports in China after conducting training exercises in the Western
Pacific that also require Chinese vessels to transit through the Japanese home islands.
What has garnered the most attention was an incident involving a PLAN frigate and JMSDF destroyer in waters roughly 100 km of the disputed islands. According to Japanese press reports, the Chinese vessel "painted" the Japanese ship with its firecontrol radar, which could have been interpreted as the first-step in an attack. Needless to say, the incident reflects the potential for tactical or operational military considerations can escalate a much broader political dispute. The PLA denies that the incident occurred and it did not occur again, suggesting that it was either not part of China's policy in the dispute or that the PLA was overruled by top party leaders.
Conclusion
The role of the PLA in national security decisionmaking is perhaps one of the most important and most challenging aspects of Chinese foreign policy to study. In the past few years, analysts and observers have speculated that the PLA has sought to push China to adopt more assertive or hawkish foreign policies that China's top leaders would otherwise not have pursued. To help illuminate this question, this paper the PLA's role in China's behavior in its territorial disputes, an issue where the PLA can seek influence as a security issue and an issue where China has been more assertive in the pursuit of its claims since the mid-2000s.
The available evidence does not suggest that the PLA has "captured" national policy in this arena. Instead, the PLA has exercised more limited bureaucratic influence in line with existing national policies. The PLA has not pushed for China to initiate new territorial claims nor to expand the content of its existing claims, with exception of the interpretation of certain aspects of UNCLOS. The PLA has not blocked China's past compromises in territorial disputes, including those throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s. To the degree that more assertive postures have been adopted in specific disputes, these postures reflect the shared preferences of the PLA and China's top leaders.
